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The launch of the Scorpions was announcedin September 1999, and the organisationbecame formally known as the Directorate of
Special Operations (DSO) in January 2001 when its
founding legislation was promulgated.1 The DSO is
the investigative arm of South Africa’s National
Prosecuting Authority, falling under the authority of
the National Director of Public Prosecutions,
Bulelani Ngcuka (referred to below as the ‘National
Director’). 
High-profile since its inception, the organisation is
generally viewed by the South African public as
embodying the ultimate crime fighters. The DSO
investigation into the arms deal concluded by the
South African government in 1999, and its
investigation into the role of the deputy president in
this deal, upped this public profile considerably –
and highlighted the unresolved issues that have
dogged the DSO since inception. 
The cherry-picking accusation
Almost as soon as successful DSO cases began to
be publicised, accusations of  DSO ‘cherry-picking’
arose. Specifically, the DSO is accused of choosing
to investigate and prosecute only matters which
they are sure to win. Sometimes this accusation
went further, to suggest the DSO had a tendency to
take over cases already substantially investigated,
taking all the credit for the subsequent successful
conclusion of the matter. More generally, there is
discomfort as to which cases become DSO
‘matters’ – in law enforcement language,
uncertainty as to the DSO’s mandate. 
It is easy to dismiss the accusations as ‘sour grapes’,
but the very real uncertainty remains as to how a
matter comes to be pursued by the DSO. What
then, is the DSO’s mandate? Given the complexity
of the answer to this question, it is unsurprising that
uncertainty exists.
The legislation creating the DSO describes a
legislative mandate encompassing a broad concept
of organised crime – any crime committed in an
“organised fashion”2 – which is so wide that just
about any matter could be argued to fall under the
DSO mandate. The legislation furthermore
specifically retains all of the police’s powers of
investigation, so that this mandate is not exclusive
to the DSO. Clearly, such a broad mandate is not
practical for those on the ground who must put it
into practice. The legislature appeared to have
envisaged that a negotiated operational mandate
would emerge, and that a Ministerial Committee,
consisting solely of Cabinet members, created by
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The ‘Scorpions’ are probably the most recognised law enforcement body in South Africa. Yet their existence
appeared to be under threat during 2003 when highly placed figures suggested that they ‘cherry-pick’ their
cases, and are open to political manipulation. There was even talk of disbandment or restructuring under the
police on the grounds of unconstitutionality. While the Scorpions appear to have weathered that particular
storm, the issues remain. Is there any substance to the accusations?
the legislation would confirm procedures for the
transferral of matters to the DSO.3
However, acrimony between the SAPS and DSO
arose soon after the launch of the organisation. With
the appointment in 2000 of Jackie Selebi as SAPS
National Commissioner, a man who was keen to
defend the reputation of the police and who clashed
with the National Director, a negotiated mandate
became unlikely. The Ministerial Committee never
sat. As a result, the DSO was forced to carry out an
internal case review, in which it considered whether
the matters it had already taken on were appropriate
or not. In doing so, the DSO came up with its own
operational mandate – more in the nature of internal
terms of reference – which outlines the requirements
a case must meet before being taken on. This was
dubbed “Circular One”.4
In terms of Circular One, the first criterion is that the
matter concerned must fall within the strategic focus
areas of the DSO. These have been refined to
include: drug trafficking, organised violence
(including taxi violence, urban terror and street
gangs), precious metals smuggling, human trafficking,
vehicle theft and hijacking syndicates, serious and
complex financial crime, and organised public
corruption. 
There are a further 14 general criteria or factors that
must be considered, covering such questions as ‘Is
the criminal activity involved complex, and does it
comprise at least five persons?’ There are also
financial thresholds that must be met. For example, a
corruption matter has a threshold of R500,000, while
serious economic offences must involve actual loss
of R5m to meet threshold requirements. 
All of these requirements must be met and
considerations canvassed before the head of the DSO
will authorise an investigation or ‘declare a matter in
terms of s28’. Prior to such an authorisation, no DSO
members are designated to a case and DSO
members do not, until designation, enjoy the DSO
special powers of investigation, which include
somewhat expanded powers of search and seizure.
This, then is the mandate of the DSO. While it does
to some extent put to rest the cherry-picking
accusation – no case which meets all of these
requirements can by any stretch of the imagination
be considered ‘easy’ to prosecute – it does provide
many loopholes for the DSO to justifiably turn down
the investigation of a case. Indeed, the major
concern of the DSO head office does appear to have
been to avoid being overloaded with trivial matters. 
However, one of the main flaws from which this
mandate suffers – arguably due to political
circumstances beyond the control of the DSO – is
that it has been drawn up without any outside input.
The question of whether a case is taken on or not
remains one which is settled internally, by the DSO
alone. Furthermore, there seems to be no oversight
body which on a regular basis reviews case
selection. Outside accountability of the DSO as a
whole rests entirely with the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development, and with the justice
portfolio committee of parliament. 
The constitutional question
During 2003, some in government suggested that
the DSO in its current form might be
‘unconstitutional’. Again, it is tempting to dismiss
such accusers as having ulterior motives.
Nevertheless, the basis for this claim appeared to be
the constitutional provision which states that South
Africa must have only one police force (the
suggested cure for the defect is the removal of the
DSO from the NPA to fall under the control of the
SAPS).5
The first thing to note is that if the DSO were to be
located anywhere other than under the NPA, it
would no longer be the DSO as conceived – that is,
a unit comprising prosecutors and investigators
working together as a team on a daily basis, carrying
investigations through to prosecutions seamlessly.
Nevertheless, some kind of secondment arrangement
with prosecutors working with SAPS investigators
could be set up to approximate DSO operation.
Yet the question remains a moot point – is the DSO,
as conceived, constitutional? While an expert
constitutional opinion cannot be offered, some
relevant constitutional provisions can be discussed.
The provision in question prohibits any other entity
from operating as a police force – from having the
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“objective powers and functions” of the police.
Only in the matter of investigation of crime does
the DSO overlap with the SAPS.   
Yet each of the objectives, powers and functions of
the police on their own are manifestly not exclusive
to the police – for example, the object of “securing
the inhabitants of the Republic” would also be
shared by the SANDF. It could therefore be argued
that the ‘investigation of crime’ on its own is
similarly not the exclusive preserve of the SAPS.
This would tend to suggest that the DSO within the
NPA is not excluded from investigating crime. But is
it empowered to investigate crime? 
The constitution provides that the National Director
has the power to carry out any “necessary functions
incidental to instituting criminal proceedings”. It
could be argued that this includes the further
investigation of certain crimes to ensure successful
prosecution. Many institutions other than the DSO
carry out investigations incidental to their functions
– such as the Auditor-General, or the South African
Revenue Service. 
Furthermore, Parliament itself considered the
question and took the unusual step of making its
opinion clear: the preamble to the NPA amendment
act creating the DSO says, “the constitution does
not provide that the prevention, combating or
investigating of crime is the exclusive function of
any single institution”.
But the constitutional provision regarding a single
police force is a distraction from a more deep-
seated question of constitutional theory, which is
relevant not only to the DSO alone but to the NPA
as a whole – the question of the immense power of
the National Director, and its impact on the
principle of the separation of powers. That power –
which resides largely in prosecutorial veto – was
greatly increased once the DSO was created,
effectively providing the National Director with
authority also over a powerful investigative tool. 
Separation of powers
‘Separation of powers’ refers to the principle of
democratic constitutional theory that the business of
government should be divided along natural lines
into the power to make law (legislative), the power
to enforce law (executive), and the power to resolve
disputes arising under law, including deciding on
whether actions undertaken by the other two
branches fall within the law (judicial). The idea is
that each branch of government must have the
power and the incentive to guard its own sphere
and to counter the abuses of the other two.
In 1998 legislation was passed that gave South
Africa a single, national prosecuting authority, in
terms of which the National Director could veto the
prosecutorial decisions of provincial directors – and
indeed of any prosecutor.6 These powers were
almost immediately subjected to constitutional
scrutiny, but in 1996 the Constitutional Court held
that this provision did not unjustifiably infringe the
doctrine of separation of powers and that there were
sufficient safeguards against the abuse of power by
the National Director.7
However, in the modern state, a prosecutor,
particularly a national prosecutor, plays a role that
to some extent impinges on the principle of
separation of powers. The DSO, as an entity of the
NPA, falls directly under the National Director, and
its decisions to prosecute are also subject to his
veto. (Even were the DSO to fall under the SAPS,
the National Director would still have a veto power
over any prosecution). 
The position of the prosecution service in any
country is interesting in that close analysis reveals
that it runs the risk of straddling both the executive
and judicial spheres. The prosecution in reality has a
quasi-judicial function (only those crimes it chooses
are prosecuted, and only those it prosecutes run the
risk of being convicted) yet it is firmly positioned
under the executive branch of government.    
The decision to prosecute a matter is not unduly
problematic because whether a conviction is
obtained depends in the final analysis on the
judiciary; in theory, even a malicious prosecution
will not succeed if the judiciary finds there is not
enough evidence to prove the charge. However, a
decision not to prosecute is more problematic, as
there is no input into the outcome of such a
decision from another branch of government.   
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In theory, the failure on the part of the prosecution
to carry out its obligations, in particular, by
declining to pursue allegations of wrongdoing by
members of the executive, leaves only recourse to
the legislature, to whom the prosecution is
accountable.8 Parliament can therefore call the
prosecution to account for the decisions it takes,
particularly decisions to prosecute or not to
prosecute. Although this is theoretically possible,
an academic paper has argued that in political
systems where the president is elected by the
legislature and therefore by the majority party in
Parliament, the probability of Parliament calling
the prosecution to account for its failure to
prosecute is low.9 This thesis appears to hold true
in South Africa, where the majority party in
parliament effectively elects the president. 
A person who feels aggrieved by the prosecuting
authority’s decision not to prosecute may also opt
to institute a private prosecution. However, this
could become particularly complex and expensive
for an unsuccessful private prosecutor.
The political manipulation accusation
Closely allied to the question of separation of
powers are the accusations levelled against the
DSO that it is open to political manipulation.
Such accusers would say that given the reputation
for excellence of the DSO, the mere fact that an
investigation is carried out against a particular
person suggests guilt and could be used to tarnish
that person in the public mind. On the other
hand, the DSO could also decline to investigate or
prosecute a matter when it should indeed do so,
in order to protect particular individuals. 
In essence, these concerns can be reduced to the
question of whether the DSO is at the same time
independent (acts against the executive or
legislature when necessary) impartial (refrains
from acting maliciously against political
opponents of the executive) and accountable
(answerable for its actions). These traits are neither
mutually exclusive nor mutually compatible. For
example, consider the situation in which the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development, to whom the DSO is accountable,
is implicated in an investigation.  
This balancing of independence, impartiality and
accountability is an extremely difficult one. In
considering whether the DSO has succeeded in
maintaining the balance, there are two questions:
first, whether the DSO has in fact thus far behaved
independently, impartially and accountably, and
second, whether the DSO is structured such that at
any stage in the future, it is unlikely to fail on any of
these points.   
Without access to detailed information on the
matters with which the DSO has engaged, it is
extremely difficult to judge the first question of
actual independence, impartiality, and
accountability. The mere fact of the existence of a
DSO investigation into the arms deal – which is
likely to implicate members of the executive – is
cited as evidence of the DSO’s independence.
However, similarly, the refusal to prosecute the
Deputy President, combined with the public
tarnishing of his name, is cited by others as
evidence of partiality. Again, without more in-depth
knowledge, these questions are almost impossible
to judge.
But in an unknown future with unforeseen facts and
unknown players, how prone would the DSO be to
fail to be independent, impartial, or accountable?
After all, President Mbeki has only one more term,
and Ngcuka’s tenure ends in 2008. 
The DSO as it is structured is overshadowed by the
fact that the National Director, its de facto head, is
dependent on the President’s continued good
opinion that he is a fit and proper person, to avoid
being removed from office. It could, however, be
argued that this requirement protects the National
Director from outside interference. He is appointed
for a non-rewewable term of ten years at the salary
of at least a High Court judge, and the grounds
under which the president can remove or suspend
him are limited.10 Also, such a decision by the
president is subject to ratification by parliament.
Furthermore, while the DSO is accountable to the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,
and to parliament, this form of accountability is
insufficient and perhaps even counter-productive
(on the independence front) when decisions on
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whether to investigate (not to mention prosecute)
members of the executive and legislative arms of
government are at issue, if the executive and
legislature are closely intertwined as they are in
South Africa. The Ministerial Committee created by
the DSO legislation, which inter alia may determine
“where necessary the responsibility of the DSO in
respect of specific matters”12 is  fundamentally
flawed in that it consists solely of Cabinet Ministers.
By contrast, the United Kingdom’s National Crime
Squad (NCS) is directed by an NCS Service
Authority consisting of 11 members, none of whom
are high-ranking members of the executive, five of
whom are entirely independent, and four of whom
are elected by associations of police officers. 
Consider that Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi in 2003 succeeded in getting his
parliament to pass legislation immunising him from
prosecution while he remained in office. (Italy’s
Constitutional Court subsequently declared the law
unconstitutional.) How much easier for him if he
could have got a committee consisting of his
Cabinet to instruct investigators not to pursue the
corruption matter which implicated him? 
Lastly, there is no provision for misconduct by
individual members of the DSO to be investigated
by an independent body. Alleged misconduct of
SAPS members as well as those of municipal police
forces fall under the mandate of the Independent
Complaints Directorate. 
Recommendations
What is clear is that the current legislative structure
of the DSO makes its independence, accountability
and impartiality almost entirely dependent on the
integrity of its officers and of the National Director.
While the incumbents may indeed thus far have
acted blamelessly, what could improve the situation
(and safeguard the future) while not interfering with
the ability of the DSO to do its job?  
• An independent committee consisting partially 
of persons outside of the executive and
legislature should exercise (post facto) oversight
in respect of DSO case selection (the exercise of
its mandate), and review the general conduct of
investigations and prosecutions after their
conclusion. 
• A decision not to prosecute should be reported 
to the committee after the conclusion of a DSO
investigation, and should be reviewable by the
Supreme Court of Appeal at the instance of the
committee.
• Removal of the National Director by the 
President should only be possible after
confirmation by  the Supreme Court of Appeal.
• Alleged misconduct by individual DSO 
members should fall under the mandate of the
Independent Complaints Directorate. 
The DSO is an innovation in South African law
enforcement which has had a profound impact on
the investigation of complicated cases. While
allegations of cherry-picking, at least since the
adoption of Circular One, do not appear to be
founded, DSO case selection is a laborious and
opaque process. The legal infrastructure within
which the DSO is situated is not without problems,
especially in respect of ensuring a balance of the
DSO’s independence, accountability and impartiality. 
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